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Abstract 
There is an increasing demand for physical security risk assessments in which the span of assessment usually encompasses threats from 
terrorism. This paper presents a brief description of the approach taken by the author’s organization based on a systematic computation of 
ratings, which are further supported by logical arguments backed by factual data. The procedure compiles the results of the threat 
assessment, vulnerability assessment and impact assessment to arrive at a numeric value for the risk to each asset against a specific threat 
given by:  
Risk Rating(R) = Threat Rating (T) x Vulnerability Rating (V) x Impact Rating (I) 
This systematic approach could assist decision-makers in selecting risk management strategy by ranking various threats in accordance to 
their respective Risk Profile. Following which mitigation measures can be explored to reduce the risk for valuable assets, and a logical 
prioritization for implementation can be achieved. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is an increasing demand for physical security risk assessments in many parts of the world, including Singapore and 
in the Asia-Pacific region. This has arisen for a number of reasons. One is the stake for which economies and businesses 
have become too critical to be ignored, particularly if a low-cost counter-measure perceived security incident giving rise to 
devastating consequences. Secondly, economies and businesses increasingly see the need to take due diligence and risk 
management steps to manage physical security risks and to protect their critical assets, just as they would of other risks such 
as financial/capital assets. 
Physical security risk assessment of threats including that from terrorism need not be a black box art nor an intuitive 
approach based on experience. Increasingly, rigor is being demanded and applied to the security risk assessment process and 
subsequent risk treatment plan. 
This paper presents a short background study and description of the systematic risk assessment methodology used by the 
author’s organization. 
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2. CUSTOMISING THE RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
Currently, there exist a number of industry publications on the topic of risk assessment. A Reference List is provided 
which includes some of the best guidelines at the present time. Notably, the publications from Sandia Laboratory Security 
Risk Assessment and Management [3] and from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which publishes a 
number of guidelines, are worthy references. A relevant publication is FEMA 426 Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
terrorist attacks against Buildings [4]. In Singapore, the authorities recommend two publications by the local authorities [1- 
2] which are often cited in risk assessments and risk management solutions. 
Based on industry guidelines in the above publications, and coupled with the author’s in-house expertise and practical 
experience, we have developed a systematic risk assessment methodology which is appropriate to Singapore and to the 
Asia-Pacific region.    
2.1. Importance of Risk Assessment 
Risk assessment is a crucial, if not the most important aspect of any security study. It is with an accurate and 
comprehensive study and assessment of the risk that mitigation measures can be determined. 
The objective of Risk Assessment is to identify and assess the potential threats, vulnerabilities and risks to which a 
facility under assessment is exposed to and their impact on its primary services and operations. 
Risk Assessment also establishes the basis and rationale for mitigation measures to be planned, designed and 
implemented in the facility so as to protect the lives of people and to reduce damage to properties against potential threats.  
2.2. Methodology of Risk Assessment  
There are numerous methodologies and technologies for conducting risk assessment. One approach is to assemble the 
results of a Threat Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment, and an Impact Assessment to determine a numeric value of Risk 
for each asset and threat pair. 
 
Fig.1 Illustration of Risk Assessment Process  
The Risk Assessment methodology introduced herewith employs both quantitative and qualitative techniques to provide 
findings resulted from a systematic computation of ratings, which are supported by logical arguments backed by factual data. 
It is based on the methodology used by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (US) [4- 5] and on a similar risk 
assessment model to mitigate potential terrorist attacks against buildings.  
The methodology compiles the results of the threat assessment, vulnerability assessment and impact assessment to arrive 
at a numeric value for the risk to each asset against specific threat in accordance with the risk formula:   
Risk = T x V x I                                                                                         (1) 
Where  
T = Threat Rating, V = Vulnerability Rating and I = Impact Rating 
The entire process of Risk assessment can be summarized as: 
x identify the assets and people that need to be protected. 
x perform a threat assessment to identify and define the threats that could cause harm to the facility and its inhabitants. 
Identify assets and threats. 
x Conduct a vulnerability assessment to identify weaknesses that might be exploited by a terrorist or aggressor. 
x Compute the risk using the results of the asset value, threat, and vulnerability assessments. 
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2.3. Identification of Critical Assets to be Protected 
Prior to conducting a Risk Assessment, it is most important to identify all the critical assets within the facility that require 
protection. 
Assets are resources of value to the facility, which can be tangible (e.g., tenants, installations, facilities, equipment, 
activities, operations, and information) or intangible (e.g., processes or a company’s reputation). In order to achieve the 
greatest risk reduction at the least cost, identifying and prioritizing the facility’s critical assets is a vital. This can be 
accomplished by defining/ understanding the facility’s core functions and processes; and by identifying infrastructures/ 
components within the facility that are essential to achieving and maintaining such core functions and processes. The details 
can be tabulated to list these assets and their corresponding redundancy and recovery plans, so that reference can be made in 
the course of Risk Assessment. Table 1 shows an example of this process.  
Table 1 – List of Critical Facilities in the Facility under Assessment 
Ref No Name of 
Asset  
Description of Asset Redundancy 
(Quantity & Readiness) 
Recovery Plan 
(Repair/ Replacement Cost & Time) 
ASST01 Asset A e.g. Production system… e.g. 100% redundancy, but requires 2 hours lead 
time to fully activate.  
e.g. $10,000 - $50,000/ 6 months 
ASST02 Asset B e.g. Emergency power 
supply 
e.g. 1 no 2 cells on hot standby e.g. < $200,000 / 3 months 
ASST03  … … … … 
2.4. Identification of Potential Threats 
The preliminary step in the Risk Assessment process is to subject the facility under assessment to a list of threats; and 
assess the applicability and probability of occurrence of such threats at the facility based on geopolitical situation, current 
events, and historical data within the region that are relevant to the facility.  
In many cases, such a list of possible or potential threats is compiled based on known criminal and terrorist activities 
within the region where the facility is located. In others, the list may be prescribed by government agencies or the body 
authorizing such Risk Assessment. Table 2 below shows a list of threats that are commonly used for Risk assessment in, for 
example, Singapore. 
It is important to note that certain threats are peculiar to a particular security environment whilst others can occur at any 
time under any environment. One common way of defining such different environments within which different levels of 
threats prevail is to categorize them into Peacetime (PT) and Heightened Security (HS) periods.  
x Peace Time (PT) - Time whereby the prevalent security situation is normal both at the national level and the facility 
level. High-level security threats are not expected to occur. For the purpose of Risk Assessment, it is commonly 
taken that baseline security measures are in place at the facility.  
x Heightened Security (HS) – A period of heightened state of alert as a result of present and lurking aggression from 
known criminal or terrorist organizations. Heightened Security situation may also be declared when intelligence 
from government agencies indicates a high risk of terrorist attacks. During Heightened Security period, security 
measures are expected to be strengthened whilst maintaining general daily routines.    
Table 2 – List of Conventional Threat Scenarios (The table below illustrates possible threat scenarios that are commonly considered in Risk Assessments. 
Actual threat scenarios to a particular facility shall be assessed on a case-by-case basis) 
S/No Threat  Description Possible Mode of Attack Applicable 
During 
T1 Theft / Burglary  
 
Unlawful removal of property from the facility 
during and/or after business hours committed by 
lone motivated individuals (insiders/outsiders) or 
organized syndicates. 
Unauthorized access with or without the use of 
special tools and equipment, including theft of 
Intellectual Property by Industrial Espionage. 
PT 
HS 
T2 Robbery  
 
Removal of valuables by force or threat of force 
or by fear. May occur during and/or after 
business hours and may be committed by 
motivated individual(s) or organized syndicates. 
Use of physical force, threat of bodily harm or 
intimidation of visitors and staff with or without 
use of weapons (either lethal or non-lethal 
weapons).  
PT 
HS 
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S/No Threat  Description Possible Mode of Attack Applicable 
During 
T3 Public Order 
Incidents  
(1) Demonstrations and/or mass protest 
situations by organized groups in the facility.  
(2) Incidents involving employees or contractors 
e.g.  labour disputes.  
(3) Fighting/rioting by unruly persons 
(4) Drunk and disorderly behavior by individuals 
(1) & (2) could include use of projectiles, stones, 
furniture, loose objects or even inflammable 
materials 
Disgruntled employees or contractors causing 
trouble in the Plant’s site / premises to attract 
attention to their cause. 
PT 
HS 
T4 Sabotage / 
Mischief  
Hostile acts to sabotage, damage, destroy or 
disable operating systems and equipment in the 
facility. May be carried out by Disgruntled staff, 
Contractors / workmen who are unsupervised; or 
external parties who enter premises by 
unauthorized means; or external elements in 
collusion with disgruntled staff. 
Cutting off electricity, telephone or utility supplies 
Tampering with computer systems, M&E services, 
plant and equipment.  
Cold sabotage with willful neglect of maintenance / 
services and manipulation of equipment 
Arson  
PT 
HS 
T5 Stand-off Attack 
with Hand 
Thrown Devices 
Subversive elements launch stand-off attacks 
using Molotov cocktail or other incendiary 
devices from outside perimeter.  
Small quantities of incendiary devices e.g. Molotov 
cocktail, thrown from outside the perimeter 
towards the facility’s critical function assets.  
PT 
HS 
T6 Explosive 
Attack with Mail 
or Parcel Bombs 
                              
Sending explosives by normal mail or courier 
services. Commonly 2kg to 5 kg TNTNEQ are 
considered.   
Concealing explosives inside mail or parcels to 
particular individuals. The device will explode 
when the mail or parcel is opened, injuring people 
or damaging essential equipment in its immediate 
vicinity.    
PT 
HS 
T7 Attack Against 
High Profile 
Individuals  
Attacks against high profile visitors (politically, 
diplomatically or commercially important 
persons, local and foreign dignitaries) 
High precision and long range sniper weapons 
(with up to 1 km range /line of sight) could be used. 
 
PT 
HS 
T8 Placement of 
Improvised 
Explosive 
Devices (IEDs) 
 
Placement of an IED inside the premises. Such 
attacks may be carried out by subversive 
elements motivated by political or religious 
ideology. Commonly 2kg to 20kg TNTNEQ are 
considered, depending on the profiles of 
pedestrians accessing the facility.   
The IEDs could be concealed and carried by hand 
in a luggage, a bag or on the body and placed 
inconspicuously at critical assets. 
The IED could be detonated by timer, remote 
control, booby-trap or pressure release trigger.  
PT 
HS 
T9(a), 
(b) & 
(c) 
Attack by a 
vehicle carrying 
improvised 
explosive 
devices 
(VBIEDs)  
The attack could be carried out by subversive 
elements who are motivated by political or 
religious ideology using IED concealed inside a 
vehicle. Commonly 200kg to 1000kg TNTNEQ 
are considered, depending on types of vehicles 
accessing the facility.   
(a) Potential adversaries may place IEDs (made of 
fuel oil, fertilizers and volatile materials) of a 
specified weight of TNT equivalent (TNT NEQ) 
hidden inside a vehicle and detonate from a 
location adjacent to the facility. 
(b) The vehicle could also park or be left abandoned 
inside the facility compound and detonate by a 
timing device or remote control device.  
(c) The vehicle could also be driven into the 
premises by forced entry and detonate by a 
timing device or upon impact. 
PT 
HS 
T10 Attack with 
Chemical / 
Biological / 
Radiological 
Agents  
Attack by subversive elements motivated by 
political or religious ideology to contaminate air 
supply and water sources via introduction of 
Chemical/ Biological/ Radiological agents into 
air-conditioning systems, water tanks etc or via 
releasing in public.  
(a) Chemical Agents - Introduction of Chemical 
chlorine, nerve agents (e.g. sarin, soman, tabun, 
VX, etc), blister agents (e.g. sulphur mustard, 
nitrogen mustard, lewisite, etc), blood agents 
(e.g. hydrogen cyanide, cyanogens chloride, 
arsine, etc).  
(b) Biological Agents - Introduction of bacteria 
(e.g. anthrax, tularaemia, plague, salmonella, 
etc), toxins (e.g. botulinum toxin, ricin, etc). 
(c) Radiological Agents - Release of Cesium-137, 
Cobalt-60, Americium-241 in public areas as 
radiological dispersal devices (i.e. dirty bombs) 
PT 
HS 
T11 Armed Assailant  
Attack 
Attack by a group of 5-7 adversaries armed with 
weapons, grenades or incendiary devices to kill, 
maim or even seize victims as hostages. 
Assailants may seize victims in a building or a 
vehicle / coach as hostages to set demands or 
propagate political statements 
HS 
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3. Threat Assessment 
3.1. Threat Assessment Criteria  
The following criteria are designed to assess the likelihood of occurrence of specific threats to a facility. Definition of 
scores from 1 to 5 (5 being the greatest threat) for each factor are described in Table 5. The average score of the sum of all 
the seven threat factors will, in turn, derive the Threat Assessment Rating. Refer to definition of rating in Table 5.  
Table 3 shows the corresponding Threat Assessment Rating, while Table 4 outlines the Threat Assessment Work Sheet 
that would be considered in a vulnerability and holistic analysis of the scenario. 
Table 5 - Threat Assessment Criteria  
(The table below illustrates possible threat assessment criteria that are commonly considered in Risk Assessments. Actual quantification of each criterion to 
a particular facility shall be established on a case-by-case basis.) 
Threat Assessment Factors Matrix 
Score Access to 
Resources 
Knowledge/ 
Expertise 
History of Threats  Asset Visibility/ 
Symbolic Value 
Asset 
Accessibility 
Site 
Population 
Collateral 
Damage  
5 Readily 
available 
Basic knowledge/ 
open source 
Local incident, occurred less 
than a year; caused great 
damage; building functions 
and occupants were primary 
targets 
Existence 
widely 
known/iconic 
Open access, 
unrestricted 
parking 
Less than 
1000 
Beyond 1km 
radius  
4 Easy to 
produce or 
acquire 
Bachelor’s degree 
or technical 
school/open 
scientific or 
technical 
literature 
Regional/ local incident; 
occurred between 1 and 5 
years ago; caused substantial 
damage; building functions 
and occupants were one of 
the primary targets 
Existence 
locally known/ 
landmark 
Open access, 
restricted parking 
Less than 
500 
Within 751m 
to 1km radius 
3 Difficult to 
produce or 
acquire 
Advanced 
training/rare 
scientific or 
declassified 
literature 
International incident; 
occurred between 6 and 10 
years; caused moderate 
damage; building functions 
and occupants were one of 
the primary targets 
Existence 
publish/well- 
known 
Controlled 
access, protected 
entry 
Less than 
200 
Within 501m 
to 750m 
radius  
2 Very difficult 
to produce or 
acquire 
Advanced degree 
or training/ 
classified 
information 
International incident; 
occurred between 11 and 15 
years ago; caused localized 
damage; building functions 
and occupants were not the 
primary targets 
Existence not 
well-known/ no 
symbolic 
importance 
Remote location, 
secure perimeter, 
armed guards, 
tightly controlled 
access 
Less than 
100 
Within 251m 
to 500m 
radius. 
1 Extremely 
difficult to 
produce or 
acquire 
Advanced degree 
or advance 
training/ classified 
information and 
vast experiences 
International incident; 
occurred between 16 and 20 
years ago; caused localized 
damage; building functions 
and occupants were not the 
primary targets 
Unaware of 
existence 
Remote location, 
precipitous 
terrain,  secured 
perimeter, armed 
guards, tightly 
controlled access 
Less than 
50 
Within 
immediate 
area to 250m 
in radius. 
Table 6 - Threat Assessment Rating 
Threat Rating 
Very High 5 Very High – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used against the site or building is imminent. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is credible. 
High 4 High – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used against the site or building is expected. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is credible. 
Medium 3 
Medium – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used against the site or building is possible. Internal 
decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is known, but is not 
verified. 
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Low 2 Low – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used in the region is possible. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat exists, but is not likely.  
Very Low 1 
Very Low – The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and tactic being used in the region or against the site or building is very 
negligible. Internal decision-makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence agencies determine the threat is non-
existent or extremely unlikely. 
Table 7 - Threat Assessment Work Sheet 
 S/no. Threats Threat Period / Rating 
PT HS 
T1 Theft / Burglary ----- ----- 
----- ----- 
T2 Robbery Rating – e.g. 2 (Low) Rating  
Explanation – e.g. The likelihood of a threat, weapon, and 
tactic being used in the region is possible. Internal decision-
makers and/or external law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies determine the threat exists, but is not likely. 
Explanation 
T3 Public Order 
Incidents  
----- ----- 
----- ----- 
 Rating 5 (Very 
High 
 Rating 4 (High)  Rating 3 (Medium)  Rating 2 (Low)  Rating 1 (Very 
Low)  
4. Vulnerability Assessment 
4.1. Vulnerability Assessment Criteria   
Vulnerability is defined as any weakness that can be exploited by an aggressor to make an asset susceptible to damage. A 
vulnerability assessment is an in-depth analysis of the building functions, systems, and site characteristics to identify 
building weaknesses, sufficiency of existing security measures (if any), lack of redundancy and duration of operation 
recovery from an attack. Criteria used for conducting a vulnerability assessment are as follows: 
x Susceptibility 
It concerns with the question of how prone the asset is to the threat due to its attractiveness in terms of its physical and 
symbolic characteristics and the level of visibility which contribute to asset’s overall weaknesses. Weaknesses are identified 
through an evaluation of the facility’s environmental, architectural and structural features, security measures and processes. 
A minor weakness is one that vulnerability is not obvious and even if it is discovered by a perpetrator, it is not easily 
overcome without the perpetrator being detected.  A weakness means that the vulnerability is obvious but not easily 
overcome by perpetrator without being detected. A major weakness means that the vulnerability is exposed to perpetrator 
and it is easily overcome without being detected.  
x Adequacy of Security 
The adequacy of existing protection measures is examined in relation to the specific threats that are applicable to the 
asset(s).  
x Redundancy  
The level of redundancy depends on the organization’s fault tolerance and mode of operations. The assessment takes into 
consideration the geographical distribution and interdependencies of the components of primary service and its back-ups 
within the facility as well as the availability of alternative work locations or recovery sites for primary service or processes.  
x Recovery Periods 
Recovery Period refers to the time after the occurrence of a threat or attack to the time when normal / core operations are 
restored be it at alternative site or alternative mode of business operations. 
The criteria by which this vulnerability assessment is conducted and analyzed are shown in Table 6. Table 7 provides the 
vulnerability rating and the corresponding Vulnerability Assessment Work Sheet is given in Table 8. 
Table 9 - Vulnerability Assessment Criteria 
(The table below illustrates possible vulnerability assessment criteria that are commonly considered in Risk Assessments. Actual quantification of each 
criterion to a particular facility shall be established on a case-by-case basis.) 
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Rating Susceptibility Security Measures Redundancy Recovery Period 
5 One or more major weaknesses have 
been identified that make the asset 
extremely susceptible to an aggressor. 
Lacks security measures Lacks redundancies. Entire facility functional again 
after 1 month after an attack. 
4 One or more major weaknesses have 
been identified that make the asset 
Highly susceptible to an aggressor.  
Poor security measures Poor redundancies. 25% of 
the facility’s function can be 
restored. 
Most parts of the facility would be 
functional again within a month 
after an attack. 
3 A weakness has been identified that 
makes the asset moderately susceptible 
to an aggressor 
Moderate  
security measures 
Moderate redundancies. 50% 
of the facility’s function can 
be restored. 
Most part of the facility would be 
functional again within a week 
after an attack. 
2 A minor weakness has been identified 
that slightly increases the susceptibility 
of the asset to an aggressor 
Good security measures Good redundancies. 75% of 
the facility’s function can be 
restored. 
The facility would be operational 
within a day after an attack. 
1 Very low susceptibility of the asset to an 
aggressor. 
Excellent  
security measures 
Excellent redundancies. 
100% of the facility’s 
function can be restored. 
The facility would be operational 
immediately after an attack. 
Table 10 - Vulnerability Rating 
Criteria 
Very High 5 One or more major weaknesses have been identified that make the asset extremely susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building has no capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat. 
High 4 One or more major weaknesses have been identified that make the asset highly susceptible to an aggressor or hazard. The building has low capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat. 
Medium 3 A weakness has been identified that makes the asset moderately susceptible to an aggressor or attack. The building has moderate capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat.  
Low 2 A minor weakness has been identified that slightly increases the susceptibility of the asset to an aggressor or attack. The building has good capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat. 
Very Low 1 No weaknesses exist. The building excellent capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat.  
Table 11 - Vulnerability Assessment Work Sheet  
 S/no. Threats Threat Period / Rating 
PT  HS 
V2 Robbery ----- ----- 
----- ----- 
V3 Public Order Incidents  Rating – e,g. 3 (Medium) Rating 
Explanation – e.g. A weakness has been identified that makes the asset 
moderately susceptible to an aggressor or attack. The building has 
moderate capability of resisting the occurrence of a threat.  
Explanation  
V4 Sabotage / Mischief  ----- ----- 
----- ----- 
 Rating 5 (Very High  Rating 4 (High)  Rating 3 (Medium)  Rating 2 (Low)  
Rating 1 (Very 
Low)  
5. Impact (Consequence) Assessment  
5.1. Impact (Consequence) Assessment Criteria 
An Impact (Consequence) Assessment was carried out to assess the consequences/impact of the probable occurrence of 
the various identified threats against the facility under assessment. The assessment is based criteria, including Loss of Life, 
Injuries, Loss or damage of building / assets, Loss of primary service (importance / duration), and Impact on economic and/ 
or socio-political well-being of the country / nation.  
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5.2. Qualification of Criteria 
Impact assessment in terms of number of life loss and potential number of injuries shall take into consideration the worst 
case scenario of a full occupancy capacity of the facility under assessment. The criteria of assessing loss of damage 
building/assets shall consider the construction cost of the building/asset. Assessment on loss of primary service shall be 
based on the recovery period of re-constructing the building/asset and/or replacement of supporting equipment which 
determine the operability of the entire facility. Lastly, assessment on impact on economic, political and social well-being of 
the country / nation is based on the envisage impact, state of preparedness, and perception of the government, as well as the 
citizens after the news of a potential threat has taken place. It is most important to note that the criteria used here are just for 
reference. The actual figures used as criteria for every facility under assessment MUST be co-developed by the Assessor 
and the owner/ stake holder of the facility. This is because the threshold of bearing certain impact (or consequence) may 
vary from organization to organization, and from facility from facility. Refer to breakdown of these criteria in Table 9. 
Similarly, Table 10 shows the Impact Rating and the corresponding Impact (Consequence) Assessment Work Sheet is given 
in Table 11. 
Table 12 - Impact Assessment Criteria  
(The table below illustrates possible impact assessment criteria that are commonly considered in Risk Assessments. Actual quantification of each criterion 
to a particular facility shall be established on a case-by-case basis.) 
S/n Criteria 0 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Loss of life No Loss 
of Life 
Less than 1% of 
population 
1% to 2% of 
population 
More than 2% but less 
than 3% of  population 
3% to 4% of 
population 
More than 4% of 
population 
2 Injuries No Injury Less than 10% 
of population 
10% to 20% of 
population 
More than 20% but less 
than 30% of population 
30% to 40% of 
population 
More than 40% of 
population 
3 Loss due to 
damages to 
building/ asset 
No 
Impact 
Less than 1% of 
Overall 
Construction 
Cost 
1% to 2% of 
Overall 
Construction 
Cost 
More than 2% but less 
than 3% of  Overall 
Construction Cost 
3% to 4% of 
Overall 
Construction Cost 
More than 4% of 
Overall 
Construction Cost 
4 Loss of primary 
services 
No Loss Less than 1 day 1 day to 
1 week 
More than 1 week but 
less than 1 month 
1 month to 6 
months 
More than 6 month 
5 Impact on national 
economic/ socio-
political wellbeing 
No 
Impact 
Insignificant  Minor Moderate Major  Catastrophic 
Table 13 - Impact Rating 
Impact Rating 
Very High 5 
Loss or damage of assets has exceptionally grave consequences, such as extensive loss of life, widespread severe injuries, 
or total loss of primary services, core processes, and functions; property damage; and a catastrophic impact on economic 
and political well-being of the nation. 
High 4 
Loss or damage of assets has grave consequences, such as loss of life, severe injuries, loss of primary services, or major 
loss of core processes and functions for an extended period of time; and functions; property damage; and a major impact 
on economic and political well-being of the nation. 
Medium 3 Loss or damage of assets have moderate to serious consequences, such as injuries or impairment of core functions and processes; and functions; property damage; and a moderate impact on economic and political well-being of the nation. 
Low 2 
Loss or damage of assets have minor consequences or impact, such as a slight impact on core functions and processes for 
a short period of time; and functions; property damage; and a minor impact on economic and political well -being of the 
nation. 
Very Low 1 Loss or damage of assets have negligible consequences or impact; and functions; property damage; and an insignificant impact on economic and political well-being of the nation. 
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Table 14 - Impact (Consequence) Assessment Work Sheet  
 S/no. Threats Threat Period / Rating 
PT   HS 
C1 Theft / Burglary Rating - e.g. 1 (Very Low) Rating - e.g. 1 (Very Low) 
Explanation - e.g. Loss or damage of assets have 
negligible consequences or impact; and functions; 
property damage; and a very low impact on economic 
and political well-being of the nation. 
Explanation - e.g. Loss or damage of assets have 
negligible consequences or impact; and functions; 
property damage; and a very low impact on 
economic and political well-being of the nation. 
C2 Robbery Rating Rating 
Explanation Explanation  
C3 Public Order Incidents  ----- ----- 
----- ----- 
 Rating 5 (Very 
High 
 Rating 4 (High)  Rating 3 (Medium)  Rating 2 (Low)  Rating 1 (Very 
Low)  
 
6. Risk Assessment  
As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the methodology of risk assessment is to assemble the results of the Threat 
Assessment, Vulnerability Assessment, and Impact Assessment so as to determine a numeric value of risk for each asset and 
threat pair in accordance with the following expression: 
 
Risk Rating(R) = Threat Rating (T) x Vulnerability Rating (V) x Impact Rating (I) 
 
The values of T, V and I are derived from the respective assessments tabulated in previous sections. To compute the Risk 
Rating (R), the values of T,V, and I are multiplied. The Risk Rating of the facility against a specific threat will be taken to 
compare with a Quantitative Risk Range to in turn establish a Risk Profile of the facility against the threat. Security 
designers, architects and building engineers can then base on such Risk Profile to design mitigation measures against the 
threat. For example, a facility that is identified to be exposed to High Risk of Vehicle Borne IED (VBIED) threat will have 
to design the structures, façade, drop-off points, lobbies in a manner that probability, vulnerability, and impact of a VBIED 
attack is minimized. Table 12 shows the Risk Profile/ Rating of this analysis. 
Table 15 - Risk Profile / Rating 
Rating Risk Level Quantitative Risk Range 
5 Very High 91 to 125 
4 High 45 to 90 
3 Medium 16 to 44 
2 Low 3 to 15 
1 Very Low 1 to 2 
 
The Risk Assessment Work Sheet below summarizes the entire Risk Assessment exercise. It captures the essential results 
from the previous 3 Assessments, computes them into the Risk Ratings, and establishes the overall Risk Profile of the 
facility against a certain threat. Table 13 illustrates how the computation is assembled and formalized in a Work Sheet.   
7. Risk Ranking 
To help the decision-making process in selecting and prioritizing risk management strategy, the Assessor can also rank 
the various threats in accordance to their respective Risk Profile. Generally, for threats of Very High and High risk profile, 
the natural selection is to mitigate the Risk. For threats of Medium risk profile, mitigation measures should be considered 
base on the principle of “ALARP” (as low as reasonably practicable). As for threats that are of Low and Very Low risk 
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profile, it is recommended that facility owners and the security designers should evaluate the Residual Risk before accepting 
them. Table 14 illustrates an example of how the risk ranking helps in selecting risk management strategies. 
Table 16 – Risk Assessment Work Sheet  
S/no. Threats Scenarios PT HS 
T V I Risk Rating 
(T x V x I) 
Risk  
Profile 
T V I Risk Rating 
(T x V x I) 
Risk 
 Profile  
R2 Robbery --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
R3 Public Order Incidents e.g. 2 e.g. 3 e.g. 3 18 Medium e.g. 4 e.g. 5 e.g. 3 60 High 
R4 Sabotage / Mischief  e.g. 3 e.g. 4 e.g. 4 48 High e.g. 3 e.g. 4 e.g. 4 48 High 
R5 Stand-off Attack with Hand 
Thrown Devices 
--- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 Rating 5 (Very 
High 
 Rating 4 (High)  Rating 3 (Medium)  Rating 2 (Low)  Rating 1 (Very 
Low)  
 
Table 17 – Example of Risk Ranking  
Index Threats 
Risk Ranking 
Risk Management Strategy 
PT HS 
e.g. R9a Attack by a vehicle carrying improvised explosive devices (VBIED) in Adjacent Area High Very High  To Mitigate the Risk 
e.g. R9c Attack by a vehicle carrying improvised explosive devices (VBIED) - Forced Entry Medium High  To Mitigate the Risk 
e.g. R10 Attack with Chemical / Biological / Radiological Agents  Medium Medium To Consider Mitigation (ALARP)  
e.g. R11 Commando-style attack Low Medium To Consider Mitigation (ALARP) 
e.g. R1 Theft / Burglary Low Low To Evaluate Residual Risk before Acceptance  
e.g. R2 Robbery  Low Very Low To Evaluate Residual Risk before Acceptance  
e.g. R3 Public Order Incidents  Very Low Very Low To Evaluate Residual Risk before Acceptance  
8. CONCLUSION 
The Risk Assessment presented here analyses the threat (probability of occurrence), the vulnerabilities (weakness of the 
facility or an asset against the threats) and the Impact (consequences of the occurrence) when such threats occur to ascertain 
the level of risk for each asset against each applicable threat. It provides security designers, engineers and architects with a 
relative Risk Profile that defines assets that are at the greatest risk against specific threats. Following which mitigation 
measures can be explored to reduce the risk for valuable assets with high risk. As it is not possible to completely eliminate 
risk, and that every project has resource limitations, security designers must gain understanding of facility owners, architects 
and engineers in the way mitigation measures affect risk; so that decisions on the best and most cost-effective measures to 
be implemented can be secured to achieve the desired level of protection (risk management) for the facility.  
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